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Investment Behavior and the Small Firm Effect
Robert J. Sweeney
Robert F. Scherer
Janet Goulet
Waldemar M. Goulet

Our purpose in this review is to develop one explanation of market behavior which is
consistent with the many empirical findings that appear to be inconsistent with the mar
ket efficiency hypothesis. To date, researchers have attempted to reconcile their empir
ical results with market efficiency based on either measurement error or structural
inefficiencies. We propose a different approach to market efficiency. We posit that the
empirical findings previous researchers report are by their nature ex post, and are a
direct result of a market which is best described as efficient. We develop a model and
provide a simulation to support this explanation.

I. INTRODUCTION
Research evidence has documented that many small firms have systematically
shown inordinately high stock price appreciation. This price appreciation coupled
with dividend payments is frequently referred to in the financial literature as
“excess returns” or “abnormal returns.” The existence of systematic excess returns
impUes the possibility of achieving abnormal stock market returns by selecting
portfoUos of common stocks with small market value capitalizations. Yet, such an
opportunity contradicts the economic theory of the efficient market hypothesis.
This theory holds that any systematically available information is immediately
known and also instantly reflected in market price which provides the investor
with a return that is strictly a function of investment risk (Roll, 1981b). There
appears to be reluctance on the part of investigators to embrace a process whereby
observed excess remrns are congruent with efficient capital market theory. This
current review resurrects the small firm effect debate by focusing on an approach
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that is consistent with efficient market theory and by demonstrating logically that
normal firm capital investment behavior gives rise to excess returns and that these
returns are at some point in time reflected in stock price.
Some financial theorists argue that a new theory is needed to explain this con
tradiction (Schwert, 1983). However, three possible explanatory fi-ameworks can
be applied to reconcile existing theory with the evidence of the market place:
1. associate measurement error with studies that report abnormal returns
(Basu, 1983; Booth & Smith, 1987; Schultz, 1983);
2 . identify structural inefficiencies in the operation of markets or
incompleteness in market models that permit excess returns to be
observed (Constantinides, 1984; Keim, 1983; Officer, 1975); or
3. demonstrate the consistency of anomalous returns with normal firm
behavior and thereby with efficient capital market theory.

Our purpose is to provide an explanation of the small firm effect that is consis
tent with the context of efficient markets and thus follows the third approach iden
tified above. Our approach is consistent with the recent work by Berk (1995), who
shows that what has been considered as size-related anomalies are not anomalous
but rather congruent with market efficiency. Furthermore, Westhead (1995) indi
cates that firm growth is related to its ability to move into new markets or niches.
The breadth of new markets is not constant, the identification of their presence is
not predictable, and a firm’s ability to compete in different arenas is not universal.
Therefore, even if the investors recognized a firm’s performance in a given market,
some surprises will still remain. The market’s reaction to those new surprises
should mimic those in our model. Specifically, we develop the argument that
observed normal market returns are a consequence of the greater size of a small
firm’s capital budget, containing embedded positive net present values, relative to
the market value of its equity. Excess returns result because of the delay in trans
lating operating decisions into market valuation decisions. The model we develop
is not to be considered a specific representation of today’s business environment.
Rather, we use this simple example to illustrate that even in a highly efficient mar
ket structure, an ex post assessment of returns will produce an empirical small firm
effect.
We operate from the assumption that an inverse relationship exists between
firm size and capital budget. Additional empirical research is needed to determine
what relation, if any, exists between firm size and the corresponding capital bud
get. In addition, our model assumes that the net present value for any year is rec
ognized immediately when the funds are raised to support the capital budget. The
timing of the recognition of the net present value will affect the size and timing of
the excess return; however, this in no way diminishes the importance of the excess
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return. While it might be reasonable for investors to project positive net present
values from multi-year budget plans, at some point investors will be “surprised” by
subsequent budget plans as technology changes and unknowable opportunities are
presented. To argue otherwise requires the market to be more than efficient, it
requires market clairvoyance.
Four fundamental propositions underlie our explanation:
1. Since firms make new capital investments up to the point where
marginal cost equals marginal expected return, firms should realize an
excess return overall on their capital budgets;
2. The excess return the firm earns leads to an upward revision in the
firm’s stock price; this increase creates an ex post risk-adjusted excess
return to the stockholder;
3. The extent of the upward price revision, and consequently the size of
the abnormal returns to the stockholder, depend upon the size of the
excess dollar return to the firm relative to the size of the firm’s market
valuation; and
4. SmaU firms as a group are likely to have larger capital budgets relative
to their total market value than do larger firms as a group, and thus earn
greater relative excess capital budget returns than do larger firms; this
leads to greater abnormal returns for small firm shareholders (the small
firm effect).

n . RESEARCH EVALUATING THE SMALL FIRM EFFECT
The identification of the small firm effect has been attributed to Banz (1981) and
Reinganum (1981a). Since the initial work, a catalog of literature has developed
with the principal focus on why such an anomaly would remain unexploited in an
environment where arbitrage opportunities abound, or, alternatively, that the small
firm effect is observed because of errors in measurement or methodology (Reinga
num, 1981b; Roll, 1983a,b). Neither measurement errors nor structural inefficien
cies have proven to be conclusive alternative explanations of the observed excess
returns associated with small firms (Dyl, 1977; James & Edmister, 1983). Support
ing evidence for either alternative explanation relies on the delicate choice of time
period examined and/or the data set employed, as the following discussion indi
cates.
Measurement Error Explanation
Table 1 provides a summary of studies employing the measurement error
hypothesis to explain the small firm effect. The table documents the research issue,
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the data used, the time period employed, and a brief discussion of the empirical
results of studies which focus on measurement error as an explanation for the small
firm effect. The most common explanation centers on criticism of the risk adjust
ment and market return measures researchers have employed. Roll (1983b) and
Blume and Stambaugh (1983) found that about half of the size effect can be attrib
uted to the use of daily vs. annual holding periods in calculation of risk-adjusted
returns. These investigators conclude that significant abnormal returns still exist.
Roll (1981a) suggests that infrequent trading may give rise to underestimated betas
for small firms, because of the greater autocorrelation of returns in such circum
stances. Reinganum (1982), however, found the small firm effect persisted even
after adjusting betas for the effects of non-synchronous trading. Risk and return
measurement differentials alone, therefore, do not account for the small firm
effect, even though infrequent trading, in Roll’s (1981b) words, “seems to be a
powerful cause of bias in risk assessments” (p. 887).
Basu (1983) found the small firm effect to be non-significant after controlling
for differences in both risk and eamings-price ratios. Yet Reinganum (1981a) con
cluded from empirical study, that results demonstrate the size effect subsumes any
eaming-price effect. Stoll and Whaley (1983) found transaction costs partially
accounted for the small firm effect, but Schultz (1983) included a broader sample
of stocks and found the small firm effect significant, net of transaction costs.
Finally, Carleton and Lakonishok (1986) hypothesized that the small firm effect
might be an industry effect.
Another approach to the measurement error explanation has been to question
whether the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) effectively captures the relevant
valuation factors investors incorporate into their decisions. Reinganum (1981b)
sought to answer this question using arbitrage pricing theory, while Booth and
Smith (1987) made a similar effort using stochastic dominance. Both found signif
icant other factors, but neither was able to effectively dilute the significance of the
small firm effect.
Regardless of the time period employed (1955-1981), the exchange where the
security was traded (NYSE or AMEX), or the issue addressed, the small firm
effect persisted. The calculation of the return, the frequency of trading, and the
risk-differential transaction cost are inadequate explanations for the small firm
effect.
Structural Inefficiency Explanations
Table 2 documents the research relating to the structural inefficiency explana
tion. A review of the studies in Table 2 shows a failure to completely explain the
small firm effect. We discuss this research below. One form of inefficiency that
could affect investor required returns is lack of information. Barry and Brown
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(1984) Studied lesser-known fkms to determine whether a risk premium related to
information could be identified. They found an association between time since
original exchange listing and security returns, but learned that a significant inverse
relationship between returns and firm size nevertheless coexisted with their mea
sure of maturity.
The level of trading activity has been tested as an explanation of the small firm
effect. Following Reinganum’s (1982) conclusion that adjustments to betas for
infrequent trading bias were insufficient to account for the small firm effect, James
and Edmister (1983) tested the hypothesis that the small firm effect can be associ
ated with the liquidity premium for less-frequently traded stocks. They found no
support for their hypothesis. Beedles (1992) examined companies trading in the
Australian capital market. This explanation posits a relationship between the small
firm effect and greater costs of equity capital for small firms. Empirically the
research demonstrates a negative and monotonic relationship between size and illi
quidity and a positive and monotonic relationship between illiquidity and riskadjusted performance. A conclusion is drawn that “this provides the clearest evi
dence ... that the high cost of equity finance experienced by small firms results ...
from their comparatively low liquidity” (Beedles, 1992, pp. 64-65).
Seasonality in markets had been researched over fifty years ago by Wachtel
(1942) and more recently by Rozeff and Kinney (1976), who identified a predict
able beginning of year seasonal effect (the January effect). Relating size and sea
sonality, Keim (1983) showed that half of the small firm effect occurs in January.
Although Keim acknowledges this explanation is incomplete, Reinganum (1983)
relates this effect to tax loss selling, reflecting the attempt to estabhsh securities
losses in the prior year.
The possibility of explaining the better part of the smaU firm effect, and most
of the January effect, as a consequence of tax strategy has attracted numerous
researchers. Some studied the domestic environment (e.g.. Brown, Keim, Kleidon,
& Marsh, 1983; Dyl, 1977; Schultz, 1985), while others focused on international
comparisons (e.g., Givoly & Ovadia, 1983; Gultekin & Gultekin, 1983; Kato &
SchalUieim, 1985; Tinic, Barone-Adesi, & West, 1987). Several studies found sea
sonality where there were no taxes (Constantinides, 1984; Jones, Pearce, & Wil
son, 1987); while some researchers identified significant tax effects either in
response to security price movements or to tax law changes (Berges, McConnell,
& Schlarbaum, 1984; Keim, 1983). Studies that relate seasonality to size generally
conclude that, whether or not there is a significant tax effect, a significant small
firm effect is still identifiable (Keim, 1983; Leonard & Shull, 1996; Rozeff & Kin
ney, 1976).
In a recent article Berk (1995) shows .. theoretically ( 1 ) that the size-related
regularities should be observed in the economy and (2 ) why size will in general
explain the part of the cross-section of expected returns left unexplained by an
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incorrectly specified asset pricing model” (p. 275). Berk demonstrates that empir
ically observed anomalies obtained in an environment where the logarithm of mar
ket value is inversely related to expected return. Furthermore, he concludes that the
finding of an inverse relationship between return and market value—the small firm
effect—is not an indictment of any model of asset pricing.

ni.

SMALL FIRM EFFECT

The body of existing research fails persuasively to explain that observed excess
returns are predicated on measurement errors or market inefficiencies. In fact,
these two explanations are contradictory and inconclusive. Thus, we develop an
explanation of the small firm effect that is consistent with the efficient market
hj^othesis. Firm behavior leads to higher stock price valuation through the normal
course of the capital budgeting process. Since firms make new capital investments
up to the point where marginal cost equals marginal expected return, fin^js should
realize an excess return overall on their capital budgets. The excess return the firm
eams leads to an upward revision in the firm’s stock price; this increase creates an
ex post risk-adjusted excess return to the stockholders. Excess returns result
because of the imperfect, or lagged, translation of operating decisions (the asset
side of the balance sheet) into market valuation decisions (the financing side of the
balance sheet).
The extent of the upward price revision, and consequently the size of the
abnormal returns to the stockholder, depend upon the size of the excess dollar
returns to the firm relative to the size of the firm’s market valuation. Moreover,
small firms as a group are likely to have larger capital budgets relative to their total
market value (capital investment intensity ratio) than do larger firms as a group.
Thus, smaller firms generate greater relative excess capital budget returns (i.e.,
returns greater than their cost of capital) than do larger firms. This leads to greater
abnormal returns for small firm shareholders. This phenomenon is called the small
firm effect. We believe the small firm effect is due to a higher capital intensity
ratio (i.e., the ratio of the capital budget to total market value). Again, the purpose
of the example is to demonstrate that the empirical small firm effect is observable
in a highly efficient market context. The effect is the market’s reaction to new
information concerning the investment behavior of firms that produces a revision
in stock price. Since firms are expected to invest in positive net present value
opportunities, we would anticipate that the preponderance of the price changes
would be upward revisions.
The small firm effect is a natural consequence of the market adjustment to a
firm’s realization of an unanticipated positive net present value from capital
investment. The following example illustrates how the market translates these
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excess asset returns earned by the firm into abnormal stock returns for the share
holders.
Capital Budget Expenditure Leads to Equity Value Appreciation
For the purposes of this illustration, assume that a firm exists in frictionless
markets and is in a steady state as of time period zero (T=0), in which initially:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

the firm is financed entirely with equity and has 1 0 0 shares of stock
outstanding;
the firm earns $ 1 0 0 per year in perpetuity;
the firm has a 1 0 0 % dividend payout ratio, $ 1 per share;
the firm’s average and marginal costs of capital are 10%; and
following the Gordon Model, the firm has a stock value of $10 per share
($1/10%) and a total market value of equity of $1000 (100 shares X
$ 10).

Assume next that the firm is provided with the one time investment opportu
nity schedule (lOS) at T=1 as described in Table 3. All projects in this lOS are
identical in risk to the risk of the firm in its initial steady state. Each of the assets
A-p through L j costs $100. The ex ante perpetual returns are given in column 3, the
expected dollar return in column 4, the cumulative dollar investment in column 5,
and the cumulative dollar return in column 6 (see Table 3). Given the available
Table 3
Investment Opportunity Schedule, Cumulative Investment, and
Cumulative Dollar Return (time period = T)

At
Bx
Ct
Dt
Er
Ft
Gt
Ht
It
It
Kt
Lt

(1)

(2)

Asset

Cost
$100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

(3)

(4)
E[$ Return]
Per Year

(5)

Cumulative
Cost
19%
$19
$100
18
18
200
17
17
300
16
16
400
15
15
500
14
14
600
13
13
700
12
12
800
11
11
900
10
10
1000
^Required Rate o f Return = 10 Percent<=
100
9
9
1100
100
8
8
1200
E[Retum]

(6)
Cumulative $
Return/year
$19
37
54
70
85
99
112
124
135
145
154
162
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projects, a 1 0 % cost of capital, and a decision rule based on the internal rate of
return (IRR), this firm will accept projects A j through Jj, investing a total of
$1000 at T=l. Consequently, the firm will generate an additional total dollar return
of $145 in perpetuity, beginning at T=2. Of this amount, $45 represents excess
risk-adjusted return because of positive net present values. The use of an IRR deci
sion rule is appropriate in this case because all available projects are of identical
scale, duration, and timing of cash flows as well as identical risk of the firm.
To finance these additional investments, the firm must sell new shares of
stock. Assume that the company discloses to the market that it intends to invest
$1,000 at T=1 in new projects that are expected to be of identical risk to the firm
as it existed up to today, that it expects to earn $145 per year in perpetuity begin
ning at T=2 from those projects, and that it intends to raise capital today by selling
sufficient shares at the equilibrium price to obtain the needed capital.
The value of the new shares depends on the information the company discloses
and on the market’s reaction to that information. Assume that the market reacts
immediately to the news by raising the equilibrium value of the stock to $14.50 per
share (see Appendix A). At this value, 68.96552 shares are sold, providing the
company with the $1,000 it needs to undertake the investments. Existing share
holders will realize a one time $4.50 (45% excess return, as the value of their
shares rises from $10 to $14.50, in addition to receiving their steady state dividend
of $1.00 (10%). Once the new steady state is reached, dividends of $1.45 ($245/
168.96552) per share will be paid, the value of the company will rise to $2,450
($245/. 10), and both the new shareholders and the existing shareholders will earn
a perpetual 1 0 % return on their investment, assuming no other changes.
Table 4 shows in detail the one period returns stockholders would earn from
T=0 to T=1 and from T=1 to T=2, where the firm both does not (Table 4A) and
does (Table 4B) acquire the new set of assets. Without accepting the new assets,
the firm’s stock would continue to be valued at $ 1 0 per share and the shareholders
would receive a constant 10% return, composed entirely of dividend yield. Under
taking the new investments at T=1 would cause the stock value to rise to $14.50
immediately, and the dividend to increase to $1.45 starting at T=2, which together
would generate a 10% return from T=1 to T=2. Between T=0 and T=l, the existing
original shareholders would realize a 55% return, which is composed of the 10%
required return from dividends (1.00/10.00) and a 45% unanticipated appreciation
[(14.50-10.00)/10.00]. Once the market makes the appropriate adjustment to the
new information, the return to the shareholders wiU resume at this required 1 0 % as
Table 4B illustrates.
Debate regarding when the timing of the market’s recognition of the excess
return to the firm and when the subsequent adjustment occurs could alter the tim
ing of the adjustment but not the effect from the adjustment. Further, the value
adjustment and excess returns will be obtained in an efficient market, but not in a
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Table 4
Return for First and Second Periods Assuming the Firm Does and
Does Not Make Investments A-J (Single Period Model)
A. Without Undertaking Investments Aj-Ji
T=0
T=1
T=2
-------------------- 1
Po=10

D ,=l

D2=1

P,=10

P2=10

Ii=10

R„,, = l ± ^ =

10 %

=

B. Undertaking Investments A^-Ji T=0
T=2

T=1

I
Po=10

D ,=1.000
P,=14.500
li=l,000

1.000+ 14.50 -1 0

„

Ro,i= ---- io----=
Notes:

= Share Value;
Df = Divident per share;
R f. 1^T = Holding period return;
all at or as of year end T

D2=1.450
P2=14.500
1.450+ 14.50-14.50

^'-2= ---- i4lo----=
j
=

X
k

“ Capital investment

= a

clairvoyant market. That is, if the market had complete foreknowledge of the
firm’s entire set of future investment opportunity schedules, the value of the stock
would adjust at the time of the initial public offering (T=0) to include the addi
tional present value of the dividend stream associated with all of those invest
ments; otherwise, the observed, ex post, excess returns is a natural result of the
rational investor in an efficient market.
The excess shareholder returns illustrated in Table 4 are sensitive to the
assumptions of an all-equity capital structure and constant risk. For some range,
the substitution effect of debt for equity would be likely to result in an overall
lower cost of capital, making more capital budget opportunities attractive. Thus,
the actual availability of positive net present value (NPV) projects, some of them
highly so, at constant risk is implausible. These assumptions greatly simplify the
mathematics of the illustration at the expense of a more realistic calibration of
return estimates. Yet the relationship between excess returns and market value
identified here arises from the capital expenditure decision itself and does not
depend on either of these simplifying assumptions.
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Excess Returns Over Time
The preceding section addressed excess returns accruing to existing sharehold
ers where a unique opportunity existed to capitalize on excess capital budget
returns. It is possible to generalize this example to a firm continuously facing such
unanticipated excess investment return possibilities. Such a firm invests each year
in equal-risk projects which, up to the margin, are expected to yield positive NPVs.
It is not our purpose here to argue that investors would (or would not) forever
remain oblivious to the possible value/information content in the incessant repeti
tion of the surprise announcement, year after year, of an unanticipated set of posi
tive NPV opportunities. The use of an annual adjustment of new information
simply allows us to illustrate analytically the relationship of capital investment and
growth to equity value. The validity of this illustration, in general, relies only upon
Table 5
Return for First and Second Periods Assuming the Firm Does and
Does Not Make Investments A-J (Single Period Model)
A. Without Undertaking Investments A-J, Ever
T=0
T=1
Po=10

-

T=2

D ,= l
Pi=10

D2=1

I,=0

h=0
1 +10-10

P2=10

1 + 1 0 -1 0
10

R i ,2 =

B. Undertaking Investments A-J at T=1 and T=2
T=0
T=1

^ ,1

=

1.000+ 1 4 .50 -1 0

10

D2=1.450
?2=19.169

l2=l,000
Ri,2 =

= 55.00%

= 10%

T=2

D ,=1.000
?i=14.500
ll= l , 0 0 0

?0=10

10

1.45+ 19.169-14.50
= 42.20%
14.50

At the beginning of T=3, the firm will acquire assets A 3 through J3 . The additional shares issued will
yield 10%. The previously existing shareholders will realize a total return of 33.3%, including 23.3%
for unanticipated equity value appreciation because of excess expected returns from the firm’s capital
investment decisions.
_______________________
Notes:

= Share Value;
Df = Divident per share;
Rr-i T = Holding period return;
all at or as of year end T

Ir= I Kj
K = A

= Capital investment
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the assumption that some future positive NPV capital investments were unantici
pated at the time of the firm’s initial public offering.
Table 5 illustrates the stream of returns and values that accrue to shareholders
if the firm undertakes investments A j through at the beginning of at least two
future time periods, and finances those investments at a stock value that impounds
the NPVof the new assets. The first period of such an investment strategy yields
results identical to the single opportunity investment case above. Thereafter, at the
beginning of T=2, the firm invests an additional $1000 in new assets A2 through J2
, 34.48276 shares will be sold. The new share value will be $19,169, determined
identically as was the value for T=1 (as calculated in Appendix A). The new share
holders at T=2 will expect to earn a perpetual 10% return, as in the single period
case. However, the existing shareholders (those who bought stock at T=0 or T=l)
will realize a return of 42.20%, a normal return of 10% plus an unanticipated
excess return of 32.20%.
At the beginning of T=3, the firm will acquire assets A 3 through J3 . The addi
tional shares issued will yield 10%. The previously existing shareholders will real
ize a total retum of 33.3%, including 23.3% for unanticipated equity value
appreciation because of excess expected returns from the firm’s capital investment
decisions.
Table 6 demonstrates the total retum that accrues to existing shareholders in
each of years T=1 through T=5, assuming assets A j through J j are acquired each
year, and continuing to assume that investors respond immediately in adjusting
stock values to new fumre retum expectations.
Table 6 shows that existing shareholders will benefit from the firm’s ability to
generate positive NPV investments relative to the market value of equity. Specifi
cally, while the NPV of each bundle of investments remains constant, the benefit
must be shared across an ever increasing equity base. Consequently, over time for
any single firm, the realized retum will approach the firm’s marginal cost of capi
tal, as shown in Figure 1.
Table 6
Realized Return in Each of Years One Through
Five Assuming Constant Capital Budget
(1)
Year Or
Quintile
1
2
3
4
5

(2)
Market
Value Of Equity ($)
2,450
3,900
5,350
6,800
8,250

(3)
Realized Retum (%)
55.00
42.20
33.25
28.11
22.15
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<of Return

Figure 1
Realized Return Over Time Holding Scale of Investment Constant
IV. DISCUSSION
The small firm effect which is observed in security returns to companies of lower
market value of equity, relative to those of large market value, is an effect consis
tent with sound capital budgeting and firm growth theory. That there is an observ
able small firm effect of some magnitude has been supported in the literature.
Evidence of the effect’s existence and attempts to explain the small firm effect
have filled the literature for some time, to the point that small firm effect has
become a term of art. Our conclusion is that this effect reflects rational behavior.
The consistency of the theoretical explanation of the small firm effect we have
developed is strong evidence that firms do follow wealth maximizing behavior.
Small capitalization firms, as a group, are able consistently to take advantage of
positive NPV investment opportunities that are large by comparison to their equity
market capitalization.
Our conceptual and analytical development focuses on firm size relative to
investment activity. However, “large” and “small” are not absolutes, but are rela
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tive terms driven more by market size, market growth, and competitive strength
than by longevity and time. Thus, the strong association of capital investment
intensity with excess returns that emerged in our illustration is entirely consistent
with financial theory and with the small firm effect that has been observed in the
literature. The small firm effect exists for that subset of small firms that are captur
ing unanticipated gains from investment activity that is relatively more aggressive
than their larger counterparts. But, this capital investment intensity effect sub
sumes size. The effect must exist for firms able to capitalize on unanticipated
investment opportunities that are significant, relative to their equity market value,
regardless of the firms’ absolute size.
Our explanation removes the small firm effect fi:om the category of an anom
aly and suggests that empirical research is required to validate this hypothesis. To
the extent that the association of excess returns with capital investment intensity is
a phenomenon associated with small firms, it is an outgrowth of rational invest
ment decision making, not an example of a market imperfection that should (but
has not) been resolved through arbitrage. More broadly, firais of any size can and
do capture investment opportunities that are unanticipated but ultimately recog
nized in an efficient market. It is between the unanticipation and the recognition
where an opportunity for excess returns arises. Future research which focuses on
the key characteristic of having a high capital investment intensity ratio (i.e., a
large capital budget relative to total market value) may be necessary. But in the
broader sense, it is not size of firm, but rather capital investment opportunity in
relation to firm size, that rationalizes the excess returns observed and unravels the
quandary of the small firm effect. Even in a highly efficient market setting, an
empirical small firm effect may be observed. Our model is posited to illustrate the
relationship between firm investment behavior, stock price, and realized return.
The model, although not an exact replica of the market, does serve to show that the
empirical small firm effect is observable in an efficient market and its presence is
not an indictment of market efficiency.
Furthermore, the persistence of the small firm effect should not be mistaken
for evidence of market inefficiencies. In a rational market, investors purchase
securities offering a return corrmiensurate with the systematic risk of the security.
On occasion, the realized return will exceed expectation; while during other time
periods, the realized return will fail to measure up to expectation. With a popula
tion of risk-averse investors, one would expect any bias to be towards underesti
mating expectations, thereby systemically creating more positive excess returns
relative to negative excess returns. Consequently, the hypothesized results
reported above serve more to support market efficiency and rational investor
behavior than they serve to refute market efficiency.
Management must recognize the time lag between firm performance and when
that performance is reflected in stock prices. The need for timely, accurate, and
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complete information by investors will improve the quality of stock prices and free
management from the need to “operate by the numbers.”
APPENDIX A
Number of New Shares Issued at any Point in
Time To Finance Investments A-J
T=1

T=2

$ 100

$ 100 Earnings (Perpetuity)
145 Additional Earnings
(Investments A-J)
245

Value of Company
($245 / 0.10)

Shares Outstanding
Dividend
New Stock Price
New Shares Issued

$2450

=
=
=
=
=

100 + New Shares Issued to Finance A -J
$245 / (100 + New Shares)
$2450 / (100 + New Shares)
Dividend/0.10
$1000 / New Stock Price

Solving the above set of equations yields:
New Stock Price
=
$14.50
Dividend
=
$1.45
New Shares Issued
=
68.96552
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